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MILLIKEN v. GREEN:
BREAKING THE LEGISLATIVE DEADLOCK
ELWOOD HAIN*
The major purpose of a: symposium such as this is to analyze a problem
or a field from a variety of perspectives. A minor purpose, however, may
be to provide a modicum of factual information-to report on recent develop-
ments. This article on the Michigan experience is aimed at fulfilling the minor
purpose of reporting events. Hopefully, persons contemplating school fi-
nance litigation or legislation can benefit from insights drawn from Mich-
igan's experience.
REFORM AND THE COURTS
A. The Preliminaries
When the Michigan school finance suit, Governor v. State Treasurer,'
was started in 1971, Michigan's deductible-millage system 2 of school fi-
nance was typical of that in many states. Under this system wealthy dis-
tricts could spend more per pupil while making less of an effort to tax than
poor districts. 3 In 1971, the richest district in Michigan had a "state equalized
valuation" (SEV)4 of $405,747 per pupil, while the poorest had an SEV of
*Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, Wayne State University; co-counsel for intervenors
in Governor v. State Treasurer, the Michigan school finance case.
1389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W. 2d 711 (1973). The
case is styled Milliken v. Green in the unofficial reports and in the circuit court records.
2 Essentially, the deductible-millage formula consisted of a guaranteed minimum dollar
amount per pupil for districts levying the minimum qualifying tax and a continuing but declining
state subvention for districts able to raise more than the minimum through local taxation. The
formula consisted of a gross allowance or foundation program from which was subtracted the
amount a given millage would raise in the district. In 1970-71, the base year for purposes of
the trial, there were two formulas, one for districts with less than $15,500 of taxable property
per pupil, and the other for districts with $15,500 or more per pupil. Districts in the first category
received a gross allowance of $623.50 minus the amount a tax of 20 mills would have raised locally.
Districts in the second group received a, gross allowance of $530.50 less the revenue from a
hypothetical 14 mill tax. Neither deductible-millage bore any necessary relationship to the actual
millage in the district. To qualify for full state aid under the formula, a district was required to
levy at least a 12 mill tax. See Governor v. State Treasurer, 389 Mich. at 18 n.3, 203 N.W.2d at
464 n.3; G. CAESAR, R. McKERR & J. PHELPS, NEW EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE
(Mich. Sen. Comm. on Educ., 1973) [hereinafter cited as NEw EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL
FINANCE].
3 See generally J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
4 In Michigan, all property assessments for purposes of ad valorem taxation are to be at fifty
per cent of the true cash value. The state provides a system to assure equalization of assessments
between political subdivisions of the state. See MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 3; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 209.4, 211.34 (1967). See generally Comment, The Michigan Property Tax: Assessment, Equal-
ization, and Taxpayer Appeals, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1397 (1971).
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only $2,165 per pupil. Naturally the disparities carried over into expenditures:
total operating expenditures per pupil in 1971 ranged from $541 to
$1,427, and instructional expenditures per pupil ranged from $398 to $1,109. 5
School finance reform was believed to be a popular issue with the
electorate, although the legislature had been unable to agree on any par-
ticular reform plan. The present Governor, William Milliken, a Republican,
had made the reform of educational financing a priority item in his first
term of office, taking a strong stand as early as 1969.6 Despite a major pro-
fessional study of Michigan finances7 and the work of a blue-ribbon
citizens' study commission," he had made little progress with his legislative
program by 1971. When the California Supreme Court decided Serrano v.
Priest,9 the Governor saw a possible alternative route to the same goal.
While the Governor's aides were considering the possibilities raised by
Serrano, Attorney General Frank Kelley, widely believed to be planning a
race for the United States Senate seat of Republican Robert Griffin, and
therefore seeking an opportunity to champion the interest of the majority
against entrenched privilege, was similarly engaged. While attorneys general
normally enter the courtroom in defense of state laws, Attorney General
Kelley reasoned -that he had a higher duty to defend the Constitution. When
Milliken and Kelley each learned that the other was planning a suit to chal-
lenge the state school finance laws, they negotiated an uneasy alliance. At
a joint press conference held on September 30, 1971, they announced that
the Attorney General would sue on behalf of both officials. 10
After the suit was announced but before it was filed, all political calcu-
lations were endangered by United States District Judge Stephen Roth's
finding that Detroit's schools had been segregated as a result of state and
local action."' Judge Roth ordered the state defendants in the desegregation
case, including both Kelley and Milliken, to prepare a plan for desegregating
the schools of the Detroit metropolitan area. The resulting public confusion
between the finance case and the desegregation case haunted both Milliken
and Kelley in subsequent elections. It may have been a significant factor in
Kelley's 1972 loss in the U. S. Senate race,' 2 and in the defeat of a November,
1971, referendum proposal to amend the state constitution to require cen-
tralized state funding of education.' 3
When Milliken and Kelley filed their complaint for a declaratory judgment
'See Governor v. State Treasurer, 389 Mich. at 19, 203 N.W.2d at 464; Milliken v. Green,
No. 13664-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., May 8, 1972) (Findings of Fact, IV, 2).
6 NEW EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 13.
7J. THOMAS, SCHOOL FINANCE AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MICHIGAN (1968).
8 GovERNoR's COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM, REPORT (Sept. 30, 1969).
9 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
10 Detroit Free Press, Sept. 30, 1971, at 9, col. 1; id., Oct. 1, 1971, at 14, col. 1.
" Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1973) (No 73-434). The case is presently awaiting a
decision by the United States Supreme Court as to the propriety of ordering a multi-district remedy
for school segregation within a single district.
I2 A major issue in the campaign was which candidate was most ardently and effectively op-
posed to "busing."
" See NEw EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 15-17.
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in the Circuit Court of Ingham County, it was obvious that the case had been
built upside down. The two plaintiffs logically should have been defendants.
The Governor based his standing as a plaintiff on a constitutional provision
authorizing him to sue on behalf of the people to end unconstitutional or
illegal practices by public officers, but forbidding him to sue the legislature.14
The Attorney General's standing was even more tenuous, based as it was
on two statutes that on their face dealt only with venue. 15
The State Treasurer, who was named as a defendant, was a more logical
party than either of the two plaintiffs. 16 His role in the legislative plan was
ministerial but crucial. He signed the state aid checks, although the amount
was predetermined by legislative formula. However, the choice of the de-
fendant school districts, three "lighthouse" districts in the Detroit suburbs,
was not obvious. On the one hand, all had large per pupil tax bases, middle
and upper-middle class residents, and above-average expenditures. On the
other hand, they were not low tax effort districts: one of them levied a tax
equivalent to the statewide average, and the other two had higher than
average taxes. None of the defendant districts was, in terms of SEV per
pupil, the richest in the state, nor, for that matter, even in the Detroit metro-
politan area. The richest districts in Greater Detroit are educationally less
prestigious districts with large industrial tax bases, blue-collar residents,
and low taxes; these districts were not joined.17
The complaint of Milliken and Kelley sought a declaratory judgment
that Michigan's deductible-millage system denied the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by both the state constitution"8 and the fourteenth
amendment 9 to school children and property taxpaying parents of school
children in low SEV per pupil districts. The taxpaying parents, it was reasoned,
were forced to pay higher taxes than parents in districts with larger tax
bases to obtain similar levels of educational expenditures. As to the children,
the plaintiffs simply asserted that the failure "to equalize expenditures
14 MICH. CONsT. art. 5, § 8.
15 Complaint, 12, citing MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 14.102, 600.1631 (1967). Parents and tax-
payers from poor districts intervened before the start of the trial, thus enabling the supreme court
to avoid a decision on the standing of the initial plaintiffs. 389 Mich. at 35, 203 N.W.2d at 472.
There were two other intervenors generally allied with the plaintiffs: a resident (and former
school board member) of a district near the median in wealth and a resident of a high valuation
district.
16 Curiously, both the Governor and the'Attorney General, as plaintiffs, and the Treasurer,
as defendant, were represented by deputy attorneys general. Before the final decision by the
supreme court, the legislature appropriated funds for the legal expenses of the defendant
school districts. So far as I know, no one has suggested that this might have made the suit tech-
nically a collusive one. Quite clearly, however, the attorneys assigned to the case were not actually
in collusion.
17 The school district defendants protested that the suit was in fact, although not in form,
against the legislature, the only agency with power to give relief. They also asserted that the suit,
thus disguised, could have been brought against any school district in the state. Consequently,
they argued, there was no case or controversy. See Brief for Dearborn City School District at 22-23;
Brief for Grosse Pointe Public School System at 30-31. In its initial decision, the Michigan Supreme
Court responded that as high valuation districts benefiting from the school finance system's
inequities, they were appropriate parties. 389 Mich. at 35, 203 N.W.2d at 472.
'S MICH. CONsT. art. 1, § 2.
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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per pupil among school districts" was a denial of equal protection of the
laws.20
B. Chronology
Events moved rapidly after the suit was filed. The school district defen-
dants, but not the Treasurer, attempted to remove the case to the United
States district court, but that court denied the request on the grounds that
all parties to the dispute were officers or instrumentalities of the state and
that serious questions of state constitutional law were involved.2 1 Shortly
thereafter, in an effort to speed the judicial process, the Governor addressed
an executive message to the Michigan Supreme Court, asserting that the
case involved controlling questions of public law that required early ad-
judication and requesting the court to give an early hearing to the case.
After a month's deliberation, the court agreed, one judge dissenting, and
ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to develop the facts and to
certify the controlling questions of law to the supreme court within ninety
days.22 The certified questions, as set out in the Governor's message,
differed from the original complaint. They still invoked the state and fed-
eral equal protection clauses, but changed the focus from uneven expendi-
tures per pupil to uneven revenue raising ability. In addition, there was
no mention of the interests of parents and taxpayers. 23 It is possible that
plaintiffs changed the focus of their argument to offer the court a rationale
leading to a remedy other than centralized state funding24-which the elec-
torate had just rejected by an impressive margin.
Before the fact-finding hearing began in late March, 1972, the supreme
court extended the time for filing the trial court's findings of fact first to
April 24, and subsequently to May 8. The addition of intervening parties
plaintiff25 caused little delay in the proceedings, as they left almost the
complete conduct of the trial to the Attorney General's staff, but the constant
pressure of an early deadline for concluding the hearing foreclosed the
possibility of a full examination of the issues and their factual premises. In
20 Complaint, 22, 23. The complaint did, however, distinguish certain unequal expenditures,
e.g., for compensatory education, as rationally justified and therefore constitutional. Id. 19.
21 Milliken v. Green, No. G-303-71-C-A (W.D. Mich., Nov. 16, 1971).
22In re Executive Message of Governor, No. 53809 (Mich., Jan. 4, 1972). See MicH. GEN.
CT. R. 797.
23 The two questions were identical except for the constitutional provision relied upon. The
first question was:
Does the Michigan public school financing system, consisting of local, general ad valorem
property taxes and state school aid appropriations, by relying upon the wealth of local school
districts as measured by the state equalized valuation of taxable property per student
which results in substantial disparities of revenue produced per student, invidiously dis-
criminate against and deny substantially equal educational opportunity to students in vio-
lation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2, of the Michigan
Constitution?
Executive Message of Gov. William G. Milliken, Dec. 3, 1971. The second question cited the federal
equal protection clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. The complaint was subsequently amended,
but only to acknowledge the passage of time in the budgetary process, not to conform the complaint
more closely to the certified questions.
24 See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
2 5 See note 15 supra.
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fact, the trial court, with the assistance of the parties, was able to preliare
any sort of findings only because of the belated extension to May 8. The
defendants were especially hampered in developing their case in the closing
days of the hearing, but the entire process suffered from the press of time.
Witnesses were omitted or were not fully examined, and some useful lines
of testimony were never developed. 26
It is difficult to gauge the effect of deadlines, but the pressure con-
tinued unabated even after the hearing. The trial court had only one and a
half weeks to prepare its findings of fact. The briefs of plaintiffs and inter-
venors were due in the supreme court two weeks later; the defense had
eleven days to reply. Oral argument took place three days thereafter, on June
6, 1972. This amazing schedule did not, however, end with a quick decision.
The supreme court issued its opinion on December 29, 1972, almost seven
months after oral argument and only two days before two members of the
court left for private life. 27 The court was divided 4-3 in ruling for the plain-
tiffs. The departing justices had voted on opposite sides of the case. A
motion for rehearing was inevitable. It was granted by a 4-3 vote that saw
the two new justices voting with the remaining dissenters. 28 After briefs
were submitted on rehearing, there was a ten-month silence during
which the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez29 and the
Michigan legislature adopted a power equalizing finance system.30 Finally,
in December, 1973, two years after the Governor certified the "controlling
questions of public law which are of such moment as to require early deter-
mination," 3' the court disposed of the case without rendering an opinion
on the merits.32
C. Trial Strategies
The Attorney General and the Governor, through their attorneys, had not
by the time the case went to trial, unequivocally adopted an "equal ex-
penditures" posture, despite the wording of the complaint. Neither had
they clearly adopted Proposition 133 as implied by the certified questions.
But they had adopted an "input" theory of equality rather than an "output"
theory,34 and they set out to demonstrate the disparity of income-raising ability
26 One example will suffice: the intervenors from poor districts felt constrained not to call two
school superintendents of low valuation districts to explore what they could do with specific in-
creases in per pupil funds.
27 See the bitter dissent of Justice Brennan, 389 Mich. at 38-40, 203 N.W.2d at 474.
28 Governor v. State Treasurer, No. 53,809 (Mich., Jan. 30, 1973).
29 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
30 Mich. Pub. Act No. 101 (1973). The power equalizing system is described at pp. 361-62 infra.
31 Executive Message of Goy. William G. Milliken, Dec. 3, 1971.
32 Governor v. State Treasurer, 390 Mich. 398, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
33 Proposition I, as formulated by Messrs. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, says simply that
"the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the total wealth of the state."
J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 304 (1970). See
also Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305, 311 (1969).
34 The "input" theory emphasizes inequalities in the resources devoted to education, such as
amounts of money spent per child, teacher salaries, student-teacher ratios, number of library
books per child, or number of elective courses. An "output" theory focuses on the educational
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and the resultant disparity of expenditures. They relied heavily on statistical
data which are readily available in Michigan.35 Their most effective evidence
compared the impact of the finance system on specific districts. It was demon-
strated, for instance, that neighboring districts in fact raised widely disparate
sums at almost identical tax rates and that specified "rich" districts achieved
expenditure levels comparable to nearby "poor" districts but with much less
tax effort. They also introduced testimony and statistical evidence that
"high SEV, high expenditure districts offer a broader range of educational
opportunities to boys and girls in terms of broader curricular offerings,
smaller classes, more highly trained or experienced teachers and more in-
structional materials including libraries and audiovisual equipment."
36
Plaintiffs' shift in focus from unequal expenditures, as charged in the com-
plaint, to unequal revenue raising ability, as certified to the supreme court, may
have occurred because the expenditure approach dictates a remedy of equal ex-
penditures-which almost inevitably requires centralized state funding. The
expenditure theory does not allow for alternative definitions of equality, so
other remedies, premised on those alternative definitions, become unavail-
able. 37 This is not to disparage a definition of equality in terms of expendi-
tures or to deny the advantages of centralized funding. The definition has
the advantage, not present in a power equalizing definition, 3 for example,
of focusing on the deprivation of the child without requiring accommodation
of the interest of local voters in expenditure levels.39 On a practical plane,
centralized state funding, at least in Michigan, has much to recommend it
over power equalizing or vouchers.40 But as a matter of litigation strategy,
product-how well pupils perform according to some standard of achievement. While equality
of educational output may well be a more desirable equality than equality of input, a complaint
cast in terms of output is almost certainly non-justiciable, and an effective judicial remedy is hard
to imagine. See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd sub nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 311-15 (1970). But see Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1147, 1166-72 (1966).
" See, e.g., MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., RANKING OF MICHIGAN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS
BY SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA, 1970-71 (Bulletin No. 1012, 1971).
16 Brief for Plaintiffs at 22.
37See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 338-45 (1969).
38 "District power equalization" is a plan which has as its goal discarding property wealth
as the determinant of a district's expenditure level. Under such a plan, local tax rates are
the sole determinant of a district's expenditures. If the state's guaranteed expenditure level
for the tax rate selected cannot be met because local property values are too low, the state must
supply the difference. Conversely, if the tax levy produces more than that guaranteed by the state,
the difference (surplus) reverts to the state. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 240-42 (1970).39 But see id. at 14-23.
40 The voucher proposal would involve giving parents vouchers redeemable for a specified
maximum sum per child per year which could be spent only on "approved" educational services,
that is, parents would be free to spend this sum to purchase educational services from an "ap-
proved" institution of their own choice. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89 (1962).
See also CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS (1970); Coons & Sugar-
man, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1971).
The primary advantage of centralized funding would be that the level of spending for education
would be a function of neither local personal income levels nor the cost of municipal services
supplied by general purpose local governments. There are obvious disadvantages as well: an in-
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a theory which allows only the remedy of centralized funding leaves the
judiciary with very few options.
The defense strategy was multifaceted. In addition to disputing the legal
premises of the plaintiffs, defendants insisted that educational equality could
be defined only in "output" terms. Again, there were readily available statistical
data alleged to indicate "output": the scores of fourth and seventh grade pupils
on achievement tests administered under the Michigan Educational Assessment
Program (MEAP).41 The key to defendants' factual case was expert testimony
that the differences in composite achievement from district to district cor-
related more highly with socioeconomic status (SES), a "non-school" fac-
tor, than with various "school inputs" such as total instructional expendi-
tures per pupil or teacher salaries. 42 By the time the defense began present-
ing its evidence, however, time was desperately short. That undoubtedly
hampered the defendants' case, but the plaintiffs' lawyers were also frus-
trated, because they had almost no opportunity to probe the many soft
spots in the affirmative defense. The statistical methodology used by the
defense's statistician, the suspect nature of the socioeconomic data used,
the nature and limitations of the MEAP testing program, the concept of
education implicit in a testing program limited to mathematics, reading,
and grammar-these were only some of the areas inadequately explored due
to the draconian time limit imposed by the supreme court.
D. The Opinions
Although the initial decision in Governor v. State Treasurer was va-
cated thirty-two days after it was issued, the approach the court took in that
decision is probably informative for those who wish, through litigation, to
reform school finance in other states. It is a study in the potential of state
constitutional provisions for affording relief from inequitable school finance
systems. The second, and dispositive, opinion is more obviously relevant to
prospective litigants elsewhere, but for the less than obvious reason that it is
not a decision on the merits at all.
1. The First Decision
The majority opinion by Justice G. Mennen Williams began, ominously
for the plaintiffs, by accepting the defendants' contention that the unrebutted
evidence showed that the quality of a child's education was not a function
creased likelihood that decision-making power would also be centralized, and the loss of the ability
of communities to choose the amount they wish to invest in education, to name but two.
41 MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., PURPOSE AND PROCEDURES OF THE MICHIGAN ASSESSMENT OF
EDUCATION, ASSESSMENT REPORT No. 1 (1969) [1969-70 MEAP]; MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND RELATED FACTORS IN MICHIGAN, ASSESSMENT REPORT
No. 4 (1970) [1969-70 MEAP]; MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND
RELATED FACTORS IN MICHIGAN, A SUPPLEMENT, ASSESSMENT REPORT No. 9 (1970) [1969-70
MEAP]; MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND RELATED FACTORS,
THE FIFTH REPORT OF THE 1970-71 MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (Working
Draft, Dec. 1971) [1970-71 MEAP]; MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM, 1970-71 RANKING OF MICHIGAN K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICTS ACCORDING TO STATE EQUAL-
IZED VALUATION PER RESIDENT MEMBER (1971).
42 See Brief for Grosse Pointe Public School System at 12-14, 19-28.
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of the wealth of the district in which he resided.43 The court seems to have
accepted the results of the fourth and seventh grade standardized tests as
an appropriate gauge of the quality of education. In addition, it must have
either not understood or not accepted the plaintiffs' assertion that the low
correlations of wealth and achievement were nevertheless statistically sig-
nificant.44 In both respects it is possible-though certainly not demon-
strable-that a less hurried trial would have resulted in a differently informed
court.
The court was not, in fact, disposed to pursue the educational quality
issue. Rather, it narrowed the issue to one of equality of financial support,
implicitly adopting the plaintiffs' position that the issue was one of input
rather than output. The court did this, however, by adopting a line of rea-
soning not suggested by the briefs. It reasoned that the state constitutional
command that "[t]he legislature shall maintain and support a system of
free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law, '45 to-
gether with the state equal protection clause, required that school districts
be provided equal financial support and maintenance. 46 After surveying
a long line of cases holding that education in Michigan is a state, not a local,
function, the court discussed the usual statistical evidence showing that
education funds per pupil varied drastically from district to district, that
the variance was largely a function of unequal property tax bases and the
state aid formula, and that poor districts were absolutely precluded from
spending the sums some rich districts spent.47
The equal protection analysis built on this factual foundation explicitly
eschewed reliance on the United States Constitution, 48 but rather claimed
to apply only state constitutional law. It nevertheless employed both the
"rationality" and the "compelling state interest" tests-but as a matter
of state law. In ruling that, for Michigan at least, education was a funda-
mental interest, the court made effective use of state constitutional and
legislative materials. 49 By contrast, in deciding as a matter of Michigan
law that wealth was the criterion of classification used by the school finance
statute and that it was a suspect classification, the court relied entirely on
federal cases, 50 giving them a wider reading than the United States Su-
preme Court was to do in Rodriguez. The Michigan court rejected local
control of education as an interest compelling enough to justify the dis-
43 389 Mich. at 10-11, 203 N.W.2d at 460.
44 Brief for Plaintiffs at 27-29.
4- MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
46389 Mich. at 11-12, 203 N.W.2d at 460-61. The state equal protection clause, MICH.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, was cited by plaintiffs along with the federal equal protection clause, U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2, in an obvious invitation to adopt an independent and adequate state
ground for the decision in a case based primarily on federal law. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 33,
56-57; Brief for Intervenors Steers, Wilson, Randall, Zeeb, and Layer at 10, 31. Plaintiffs'
briefs did not rely at all on the phrase "maintain and support," which was without relevant
prior judicial interpretation.
47 389 Mich. at 13-15, 203 N.W.2d at 461-67.
4" Id. at 38, 203 N.W.2d at 473.
49 Id. at 25-28, 203 N.W.2d at 468-69.
50 Id. at 28-29, 203 N.W.2d at 469-70.
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crimination; and, in an analysis anticipating Mr. Justice White's dissent in
Rodriguez,51 it also found the local control argument wanting on the
more lax "rationality" standard, labeling as a "hoax" on poor districts the
assertion that the deductible-millage system provided a local option to seek
excellence.52 Furthermore, the court asserted that less onerous alternatives
were available to promote local control without gross discrimination. How-
ever, it cited an unlikely pair of alternatives, perfection of the deductible-
millage formula or alteration of district boundaries.5 3 The latter is ob-
viously limited as a device for promoting either local control or greater
equality, but could be used to eliminate some of the greatest disparities.
As for the former, the court's suggestion that the deductible-millage for-
mula might be perfected is forgivable, for none of the briefs mentioned that
the formula inevitably discriminates. Among districts taxing at rates above
the deductible millage, it discriminates in favor of the wealthy; among
districts taxing at rates lower than the deductible millage, it discriminates
in favor of the poorer districts. Both wealth-based discrimination and re-
verse discrimination are inherent in the formula; adjustments can only alter
the point at which the discrimination is reversed. 5
4
Since the action was for declaratory relief, the court declined to order an
immediate remedy. It found the finance system unconstitutional, but would
not go so far as to forbid unequal expenditures based on reasonable
classifications.5 5 Coming close to a finding of mootness, the court pointed
out that its ruling applied only to a state aid statute that had been super-
seded during the pendancy of the suit.56 Obliquely giving its decision only
prospective effect, it explained that it would "stand ready upon adoption of
51411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973).
52 389 Mich. at 29-33, 203 N.W.2d at 470-7 1. Justice Williams waxed indignantly metaphorical
on the last point:
[Rlecognizing that by "local control" may be meant the option to levy additional taxes
for specially desired educational services, the validity of that argument must be met head-
on. That just is not what the option is.
To begin with the school property tax is not a pleasure horse to ride into greener
pastures, it is the work horse to cover the everyday rocky road of school finance. School
district property taxes are the largest element in the combined state public school financing
system....
In addition this so-called option is not really an option at all for the poorer (per pupil)
school districts. Because of the 50-mill tax limitation of Const 1963, art 9, § 6, and the lo y
revenue per added mill levied, the greener pastures of the richer school districts can remain
an ever receding mirage for the school district with low state equalized value per pupil.
... [Tlhe seemingly plausible argument of local control to permit school districts to
opt for the greener pastures of education is really a heavy yoke for all school districts to
bear and adds up to the major share of the state's burden to "maintain and support" free
public schools. For the poorer school districts it is a hoax that they can follow the richer
school districts into the green pastures. All in all, this Court finds no rationality justifying
the substantial inequalities found.
Id. at 32-33, 203 N.W.2d at 471.
53 Id. at 30-31, 203 N.W.2d at 470.
51 See NEw EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 6-8.
55 389 Mich. at 34, 203 N.W.2d at 472.
56 Id. at 38, 203 N.W.2d at 473-74. The statute was a deductible-millage statute differing only
slightly from the statute before the court. Mich. Pub. Act No. 258 (1972). It should not be confused
with the power equalizing statute subsequently passed, Mich. Pub. Act No. 101 (1973).
a new school aid formula and before levy of school taxes to entertain...
a petition to test the new combined [state and local] public school financing
system, and, if appropriate, fashion suitable orders. 5 7
2. The Second Decision
Almost a year after its original decision, the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cided that the case should not have been heard, and consequently dismissed
it. There was some initial confusion about precisely what the grounds were for
this decision, as the court issued an amendment of its one-sentence opinion
one week after it was issued. In its amended decision, the court held that
it had improvidently certified the questions upon which the case was
argued.58 Evaluated on its own terms, the final disposition of the case is not
persuasive. The state rule on certified questions unmistakably gives the
supreme court discretion to permit a lower court to certify a question on the
motion of the governor.5 9 There is, however, no discretion to deny the
governor the right to seek declaratory relief in the trial courts and, if un-
successful, to appeal to the supreme court in the usual fashion. 60 Hence,
if the certification of questions were improvident, the proper disposition
would seem to be to remand the case to the court that had certified the
questions upon orders from the supreme court. Instead, the court dismissed
the whole case.
This analysis suggests that the court did not feel compelled to dismiss
the case because of a technicality. 6 x Rather, the court seems to have rec-
ognized that the legislature, set in motion partly by the court's earlier de-
cision, had moved as far and as fast as the court could reasonably have ex-
pected. The case had become moot, but for some reason the court was
unwilling to so rule. 62 It may be that the court felt, not that its original
decision to certify the questions had been improvident, but that to answer
the questions at such a late date would be improvident. Understood in this
light, the court stumbled a bit in its formal justification, but skillfully
avoided either political credit or blame for a result achieved through
forces the court had helped to set in motion.
5 389 Mich. at 38, 203 N.W.2d at 474.
" The first version recited that "a request of the Governor for an Advisory Opinion" had been
improvidently granted. Governor v. State Treasurer, slip opinion at 1 (Mich., Dec. 7, 1973).
The amended version said that "a request of the Governor for the certification of questions"
had been improvidently granted. Governor v. State Treasure.r, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711
(1973) (amended order). The first version was clearly a mistake, as the Governor had not sued
under the constitutional provision authorizing advisory opinions, MICH. CONST. art 3, § 8, but under
another portion of the constitution that authorizes him to sue state officers or political subdivisions
to restrain violations of constitutional rights. See MICH. CONsT. art. 5, § 8.
59 MICH. GEN. CT. R. 797.60 See MICH. CONsT. art. 5, § 8; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 521.
61 This view is bolstered by the fact that the court initially misstated the ground for decision.
62 The concurring justices seem to have felt the case to be moot, 390 Mich. at 389 n.1, 401-02,
212 N.W.2d at 711 n.1, 717, but they were not content to decide the case solely on that ground.
Rather, they reached the merits and disposed of them by reasoning similar to that of the majority
of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973). See 390 Mich. at 389, 212 N.W.2d at 711 (concurring opinion).
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II
REFORM AND THE LEGISLATURE
While Governor v. State Treasurer languished in the courts, political
forces were prodded to work toward an accommodation. In the very early
stages of the litigation, the voters of the state faced an initiative proposition
that would have amended the state constitution to require centralized state
funding of public schools. Under this proposal, school districts would have
been completely funded by the state except for a small "enrichment"
millage available by local option. A separate amendment set forth in a
companion initiative proposition would have authorized a graduated income
tax to pay for the increased state spending. Although sponsored by the
Michigan Education Association and endorsed by the Governor, the pack-
age failed badly. There were several reasons for this, but the funding issue
was fundamental. The progressive income tax has been a partisan issue in
Michigan for over a generation, with labor and Democrats pressing for it
and business and Republicans resisting. The 1963 constitution accurately
reflects the stalemate: it authorizes an income tax, but requires that it be
a flat rate tax.63 The Michigan Education Association proposal, designed
to appeal to both parties, in fact worried both. The Republicans objected
to the graduated tax. The Democrats, who are concentrated in industrialized
areas, wanted the graduated income tax but feared that it would be defeated
while the centralized funding of education provision passed; the result, as
they saw it, would have been to transfer part of the cost of schools from
industry to wage earners and consumers. In addition, there was widespread
concern that a centralized funding plan might pose a threat to local con-
trol. While these fears alone might have defeated the initiatives, the De-
troit school desegregation case sealed their fate. A month before the elec-
tion, the United States district court indicated it was considering a multi-
district remedy for school segregation in the predominantly black Detroit
district. Some voters confused the funding issue with desegregation and
opposed both. Others, more analytical, reasoned that multi-district desegre-
gation would be less likely if a court were faced with a patchwork of tax
bases, millage rates, and expenditure levels than if all school districts were
centrally funded. The upshot of the matter was overwhelming defeat for
centralized funding.
After the supreme court issued and then recalled its December, 1972,
opinion that the deductible-millage formula was unconstitutional, the leg-
islature began moving."4 When the Governor and the Senate leadership ad-
63 MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 7. Considerable progressivity has in fact been generated by a high
personal exemption coupled with a fairly high nominal tax rate.
64 The Michigan Senate acted first, under Republican leadership, but with bipartisan support,
to design an effort-rewarding or power-equalizing system. Senate opposition, led by out-state
Republicans (those from areas other than metropolitan Detroit) from low valuation, low effort
districts receiving large amounts of state aid under the deductible-millage formula, lost an ex-
tended floor fight against the proposal. The Democratically-controlled House considered and
rejected a full state funding plan before it tentatively approved a system of common per-pupil
expenditures financed by local and state sources. The subsequent defection of Democrats from
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vanced a power-equalizing bill, the former alliances among school dis-
tricts crumbled. Schoolmen who had been polarized into high-valuation
and low-valuation blocs were thrust into a debate in which interests were
measured on a high-tax effort, low-tax effort continuum. Before a low
effort bloc could solidify, the Governor had put together a coalition of
education reformers and lobbyists from high effort districts, the most re-
markable ones being spokesmen of the three districts the Governor had
sued in his challenge of the deductible-millage system. 65 That coalition
succeeded in passing the Governor's effort-rewarding statute,66 named the
Bursley Act after its chief legislative sponsor, the chairman of the Senate
education committee.
The Bursley Act has two major characteristics: it equalizes operating rev-
enues raised per pupil per mill in all but the wealthiest of districts, and it
partially equalizes revenues for retiring bonded indebtedness for capital
outlays. The formula for operating funds is phased in over three years. In
the first year, 1973-74, combined local revenue and state aid are guaranteed
to equal $38 per pupil per mill for the first 22 mills. To state the guarantee
differently, each district is given the revenue-raising power of a district with
$38,000 SEV per pupil. 67 This amounts to $836 per pupil for all dis-
tricts levying 22 mills. In 1974-75, the figures will be $39 per pupil per
mill for the first 25 mills. In 1975-76, the state will guarantee $40 per pupil
per mill without limitation on the number of mills. In all cases, any district
which raises more per mill than the guaranteed amount keeps the excess
revenue; there is thus no "recapture" provision, as is the case with pure
power equalizing. In the school year preceding the implementation of the
Bursley Act, the median millage in Michigan was approximately 24.5,
yielding on the average about $818 per pupil. By 1975-76, that levy will
yield almost $1,000 per pupil under the Bursley Act, an increase of 22.2
per cent.66
The formula for partially equalizing the ability to pay for capital outlays
is essentially the same. 69 In effect, the state helps each district repay its
bonded indebtedness as if it were a $38,000 SEV per pupil district in
1973-74, or a $39,000 SEV per pupil district in 1974-75. The amount of
state aid for both operating and capital expenses is subject to a single 22
mill ceiling in 1973-74 and to a 25 mill ceiling in 1974-75. The statute
simply does not discuss reimbursing districts for capital outlays in 1975-76,
the year the ceiling is removed on operating millages. Low valuation dis-
tricts with low operating millages and high debt retirement millages are
particularly aided by this provision, which allows them to retire debts on
schedule with reduced local tax effort and to divert the rest of their tax
high effort districts forced the House Democratic leadership to accept the basic approach of the
Senate.
65 See NEW EQuITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 28-30.
66 Mich. Pub. Act No. 101 (1973).
67 Only three per cent of Michigan pupils live in districts with an SEV per pupil greater than
$38,000. See NEW EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE app. I, at xii.68 Id. at 25-26.
69 Mich. Pub. Act No. 101, § 27 (1973).
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effort to operational funds.
Although it is still too early to evaluate the overall social impact of the
new system, some observations can be made. Quite clearly, school finance
will not hereafter be a function of the real property wealth of a district ex-
cept in the handful of districts which have an SEV of more than $40,000
per pupil. All districts now have a real choice of expenditure levels. The
choice is not as unencumbered by noneducational considerations as one
might wish however. Because they feel they cannot afford to raise local prop-
erty taxes, districts with a high concentration of low income voters or with
a high tax rate for non-school purposes, or both-as in Detroit-are less able
than other districts to qualify for the higher levels of state aid their state
taxes help pay for. Under statutes that predate the effort-rewarding for-
mula, Michigan attempts to deal with these problems. A "municipal over-
burden" categorical aid provision in the school finance statute was re-
tained.70 While the amount of money authorized under the municipal over-
burden section is inadequate to achieve full equality of school taxing power,
it is a modest step in that direction. The impact of property taxes on low
income persons is eased by a "circuit-breaker" tax relief device passed in
the same legislative session as the Bursley Act and applicable to all forms
of property taxes, rather than to school taxes alone. 71 Under the "circuit-
breaker" device the state grants an income tax credit to low income home-
owners and renters. The credit amounts to 60 per cent of the amount by which
the property taxes on a home exceed 3.5 per cent of the total household in-
come.72 Persons with incomes too low to take full advantage of the credit re-
ceive a cash rebate. Hopefully, the circuit-breaker device will reduce opposition
to local school millages once the public understands that it is not forced to choose
between educational quality and the living standards of the poor. Even after
considering these leveling devices apart from the effort rewarding formula,
it is likely that upper-middle class districts will be most able to afford the
higher tax levies that produce state subsidies-to which all taxpayers in the
state contribute. But that difficulty is not as gross as the inequalities under
the deductible-millage formula, nor is it as defiant of legislative correction.
A special concern of educational reformers has been the impact on big-
city school systems. The Detroit school district, with approximately 280,000
pupils, is the fifth largest in the United States. 73 In many ways it is the
paradigmatic big-city district. Almost seventy per cent of its pupils are
black. The voters are almost evenly divided between blacks and whites,
7 0 Id. § 25. The municipal overburden section provides extra funds on a graduated basis for
school districts that depend on a tax base which is subject to ad valorem taxes for noneducational
public service expenditures in excess of 125 per cent of the statewide average tax rate for such
purposes. Most of the municipal overburden money goes to Detroit.-See note 75 infra.
71 Mich. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 206.504-206.530 (Supp. 1974).
72 The credit is 100 per cent of the excess for elderly persons and certain veterans. For renters,
17 per cent of the annual rent is attributed to property taxes. The maximum tax credit for a
renter is $500.
S ee Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306
(U.S. Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 73-434), for a detailed description of the Detroit school district in the
context of a desegregation suit.
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although the black percentage rises annually. A high percentage of the
whites are elderly. As a result of the November, 1973, elections, a majority
of the school board is black for the first time in history. Voter support
for millages has been low for years, a reflection of racial tension, high
municipal taxes, and a declining middle class population, among other
things. The deductible-millage system, considered in isolation, neither
favored nor disfavored Detroit as compared with the rest of the state, as
the Detroit SEV per pupil is about the median of all districts in the state.
Although the total appropriation for the municipal overburden is small,
a large percentage of it goes to Detroit.7
4
Despite its superficial neutrality, the effort-rewarding method of state
aid, which allows the voters to select the spending level, has a potentially
severe impact on Detroit's school children. Voter resistance in 1972 and
1973 defeated a series of millage renewal proposals, dropping the school
tax rate in Detroit to about 15 mills, one of the lowest in the state. Total
tax burdens on Detroiters nevertheless remained heavier than elsewhere,
due to the high level of expenditures for other public services. In a bill de-
signed to encourage Detroiters to pass millage proposals, the legislature
authorized the Detroit school board to levy a one per cent personal and cor-
porate income tax whenever the property tax millage falls below 22 mills,
the maximum millage subsequently equalized under the first phase of the
new finance plan.75 The tax effort represented by the school district
income tax is credited under the Bursley Act as a millage of comparable
revenue-raising power.7 6 The legislature expected that Detroiters would pass
a millage to eliminate an additional income tax once they realized that a
much higher percentage of property taxes than income taxes is paid by
industry and nonresidents. Two subsequent millage elections, one to restore
the property tax to its pre-income tax level and the other to renew an ex-
piring school millage, justified that faith. In the first election the millage
passed comfortably, reversing a pattern of defeating school millages by
growing margins; the second election saw the millage approved by more
than two-thirds of the voters. Detroiters still bear an inordinate tax burden
compared to their suburban neighbors, but realistically they can no longer
hope to reduce it by cutting school taxes.
The reaction of school districts to the Bursley Act is not yet certain, but
early indications are that differences among districts in per pupil expendi-
74 The Bursley Act appropriated $24,000,000 for all school districts eligible for municipal
overburden payments. This was less than 2 per cent of the total funds appropriated by the Act.
Detroit received $20,350,000 of the municipal overburden fund, the equivalent of about 3
mills of local taxation without state aid or 2 mills of local taxation with the state-guaranteed yield
established by the Bursley Act. Municipal overburden money accounts for almost- 8 per cent
of Detroit's $263,000,000 operating budget.
The Detroit school district income tax was initially authorized in March, 1973. MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 340.689 (Supp. 1973). The school board actually implemented the tax in July, 1973,
but rescinded it retroactively after the voters, in November, 1973, approved a property tax millage
which was retroactive to July. The income tax authorization was not at that time contingent upon
the millage being below 22 mills. The statute was revised in March, 1974, to make it contingent
upon the millage level in the district. Mich. Pub. Act No. 47 (1974).
76 Mich. Pub. Act No. 101, § 22 (1973).
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tures will be considerably lessened. While a year or two will have to pass
before local district adaptations to the new system can be confidently eval-
uated, a scattering of recent millage elections may indicate the ultimate
outcome. There is a clear movement on the part of low effort districts to raise
taxes, a trend that was predictable, as these districts will lose much of their
state aid unless they increase their local tax effort. The deductible-millage
formula discouraged tax effort in these districts, while the new formula re-
wards it. Consequently, the sponsors of the Act felt no need to include a
minimum millage requirement in the measure.77 Returns from districts in
the top quartile of tax effort are evenly mixed, with some districts retaining
high taxes or even raising them, and others lowering them. While it is too
early confidently to assess the reasons why some districts retained high taxes,
the Governor's education advisor reports that local conditions seem to be
decisive.78 A need for major repairs to several buildings might influence
one district to keep taxes high for one more year while another may not yet
have educated its voters or board members to the fact that the same quality
of schools can be had at a lower tax rate. Once the ceiling on state aid is
removed, tax rates and per pupil expenditures are expected to vary within
a much smaller range than under the deductible-millage system.
One side effect of the new system may be a reduction in the number of
small school districts: to the extent that opposition to consolidation has
been rooted in a desire to preserve low tax rates in high valuation districts,
the basis for anti-consolidation sentiment will be almost completely elim-
inated once the new system is fully implemented.7 9 The provision for par-
tial equalization of bonded indebtedness millages is a more pointed but
probably less significant incentive for consolidation. Since that section of the
Act is expressly limited to districts which operate classes from kindergarten
through twelfth grade, 0 the effect is to deny state aid for capital expendi-
tures by districts operating only through grade eight, a class of districts
generally considered too small to be able to offer a satisfactory program.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to say who won and who lost in the Michigan school
finance litigation. It probably does not matter. The judicial position that
the deductible-millage system was unconstitutional, transitory though that
position proved to be, broke the legislative deadlock. Once legislators and
school leaders could not be sure that the result of legislative stalemate would
be the status quo, a new coalition was able to strike out on a new path under
executive leadership. The resulting legislation is not perfect: it favors high
income districts and districts with few competing demands for tax dollars.
7See NEw EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 21.
78 Telephone interview with Dr. James Phelps, Special Assistant to the Governor, Feb. 19, 1974.
79 See NEw EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 21. Opposition to consolidation may, of
course, be based on other factors, such as perceptions of social class. See Scott, School District
Integration in a Metropolitan Area, 4 EDUC. & URBAN SOC'v 135 (1972).
80 Mich. Pub. Act No. 101, § 27 (1973).
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But, especially considered in conjunction with other statutory changes ap-
proved at the same legislative session, it reduces the irrationality and un-
fairness of the school finance system while making some degree of local
control a reality in every district. In an imperfect world, this is not an
unhappy result.
